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Not com petent to produce tanks
The Ram and Tank Production in  
Canada, 1939-1945
Graham Broad
In  S e p te m b e r  of 1926 th e  L ondon  D aily  Telegraph published  an  article by C aptain  Sir 
Basil L iddell-H art en titled  "The R em aking of 
M odem  A rm ies” in  w hich H art, a lready  one of 
B r i ta in ’s  fo re m o s t  m il i ta ry  h i s to r ia n s ,  
proclaimed th a t infantry’s day w as done and  that 
th e  ascendancy  of a rm oured  w arfare w as a t 
h an d . The crux  of h is  argum en t w as th a t the 
m achine gun, mobile now by virtue of motorized 
g u n  c a r r ie r s ,  h a d  m a d e  th e  a d v a n c e  of 
u n p ro te c te d  tro o p s  a c ro s s  n o -m a n ’s - la n d  
im possible. Only m assed  form ations of tanks. 
H art concluded, could b reach  enem y lines. In 
G erm any, France, the Soviet Union, an d  the 
United States, m ilitary m en like Heinz Guderian, 
C harles de G aulle, M.N. T ukhachevsky. and  
George S. Patton h ad  already arrived a t the sam e 
conclusion: the  ta n k  w as the  fu tu re  of warfare, 
the  redem ption of mobility, the  trium ph  of m ind 
over m u d .1
In G reat B ritain , however, the apostles of 
a rm oured  w arfare were sneered  a t in  an  arm y 
anx ious to  re tu rn  to “p roper soldiering, ” w hich 
did no t involve tinkering  w ith expensive and  
u n tried  m echan ical toys.2 The F rench  plunged 
m ost of the ir m ilitary energies into the fan tasy  
of an  im pregnable  line of fortifications. The 
advocates of "deep w arfare” in  the Soviet Union 
perished  in  the  a rm y  purge, victim s of S talin 's  
C aesar-like  susp ic ion  of m en who th in k  too 
m u c h .3 In th e  U n ited  S ta te s , iso la tio n ism , 
pacifism , and  the G reat D epression colluded to 
bring ta n k  developm ent to a  halt, an d  only 35 
tan k s  were built in  the 20 years after the end  of 
the  F irs t World War.4 C anada, a  pygmy with a 
proud m ilitary heritage, w eathered the pall and  
decay of arm ed forces in  the  1920s an d  1930s 
w orst of all. As late  as  1938, the  m ainstay  of 
Canada's arm oured forces was a  dozen m achine-
gun  ca rrie rs , m idget ta n k s  th a t  looked like 
b u m p e r -c a r s  in  a  m idw ay  r id e .5 In  1939, 
G erm any alone h ad  adequate ly  p repared  its 
arm ed forces for mobile warfare. T hough only a 
fraction of H itler's arm y w as m echanized w hen 
w a r  e r u p te d  in  S e p te m b e r ,  th e  m a s s e d  
form ations of ta n k s  th a t  form ed the core of the 
W ehrmacht cu t like a  scythe across Europe.
If, a s  one h is to r ia n  h a s  observed , “th e  
in d iv id u a l  s o ld ie r . . .w a s  c e n t r a l  to  th e  
m ythologized version” of the  F irs t World War 
and, in society’s rem em brance of it, "battles were 
won by m en, no t m ach in es ,”6 there  can  be no 
m istaking the fact th a t the Second World War is 
rem em bered as  a  w ar of m achines. It w as a war 
fought w ith  ten s  of th o u sa n d s  of tanks, p lanes, 
an d  guns; it w as a w ar of m ateriel, fought in 
factories as  well as  on battlefields, a  war, as one 
general w as la te r to rem ark , "for bu lldozers.”7 
It in  no  w ay be littles  th e  sacrifice m ade by 
th o u san d s of C anadian soldiers to  acknowledge 
th a t all their exertions m ight have am ounted  to 
little had  the Allies not produced the im plem ents 
of w ar a t th ree or four tim es the  ra te  of the Axis 
pow ers. U ltim ately, the Allies w on the  Second 
World War because  the Axis could no t endure  a 
p ro tra c te d  w a r  a g a in s t  a c o a litio n  w hose 
econom ic resou rces were several tim es g rea ter 
t h a n  i t s  o w n . A g a in s t  th e  h ig h  leve l of 
professional com petence of the  G erm an officer 
corps, the  trem endous fighting qualities of the 
average G erm an  soldier, an d  th e  technological 
superio rity  of the  W ehrm acht 's  tan k s , sh eer 
weight of num bers w as often the only advantage 
which Allied g round  forces possessed .8
C anada’s contribution to the w ar of m ateriel 
w as im pressive. Nearly a  million m otor vehicles 
of all types rolled off th e  assem b ly  lines of
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Valentine tanks being constructed at the Angus Shops in Montreal, 26 May 1942.
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C anada’s automotive industry, the fourth largest 
in the world, during the six years of war. C anada 
p roduced  m ore tru ck s  th a n  G erm an, Italy, and  
J a p a n  com bined, supply ing  ha lf of the  British 
arm y’s m otor tra n sp o rt.9 This explains why the 
B ritish arm y w as fully m echanized by 1942, 
while the G erm an arm y w as increasingly reliant 
on captured  vehicles and  hundreds of thousands 
of h o rse s .10 C an ad a 's  ta n k  p rogram  w as far 
sm aller, b u t  a  rem ark ab le  acco m p lish m en t 
nonetheless. While C anada’s total production of 
5,766 tanks and self-propelled guns was dwarfed 
by th e  nearly  62 ,000  p roduced  in G erm any, it 
none the less exceeded the  production  to ta ls of 
the ju n io r  Axis p a rtn e rs , Italy an d  Ja p a n , and  
th a t a t a  tim e w hen nearly  the  en tire  C anad ian  
a u to m o tiv e  in d u s try  w as co n v e rted  to  th e  
p roduction  of m otorized tran sp o rt.
M oreover, while C a n a d a 's  p ro d u ctio n  of 
motorized transport stem m ed naturally  from the 
country’s pre-existing industria l in frastructu re , 
the production of tanks reveals a great deal about 
the  n a tu re , an d  lim its, of C anada 's  w artim e 
m anufacturing  capabilities. The Ram. C anada's 
con tribu tion  to the  evolution of tan k  design in 
the Second World War. becam e obsolete because 
C anada  lacked the engineering ta len t to keep 
pace  w ith  ta n k  developm ent in  th e  U nited  
S ta te s .11 B ut the  u ltim ate  fate of the  Ram  w as 
determ ined  no t only by its obsolescence, for
in d ee d  th e  ta n k  th a t  re p la c e d  it, th e  M4 
Sherm an, was in m any respects obsolete as well, 
b u t also and  p erhaps predom inantly  because of 
th e  o v era rch in g  im p o rtan ce  th a t  C a n a d a ’s 
m ilitary leadersh ip  a ttached  to standard iza tion  
on a  N orth A m erican basis.
On the  ou tb reak  of w ar in Septem ber 1939 
the m ilitary gave no consideration to producing 
tanks in C anada and  the governm ent agreed tha t 
its forces would be supplied with tanks of British 
m a n u fa c tu re .12 Not only did a repo rt to the 
B ritish  M in istry  of S u p p ly  in  M arch  1940 
c o n c lu d e  th a t  C a n a d ia n  f irm s  w'ere n o t 
com peten t to p roduce ta n k s ,13 b u t C anad ian  
in d u s t r y  a s  a  w hole  w as  a lso  d ra s tic a lly  
underu tilized  for the  first eight m on ths of the 
war. Precious m onths, du ring  which C anad ian  
firm s m ig h t hav e  m obilized  for w a r  w ork, 
slipped by. W ith the  D epartm en t of Supply  in 
London eager to foster Britain’s owm arm am ents 
industry , C anada  w as trea ted  as  purely  as  a 
m arginal sou rce  of a rm am en ts. Factories th a t 
m ight have converted to m ilitary production sa t 
idle or con tinued  to work on civilian orders; 
indeed, 1940 w as an o th er bum per year for the 
passenger car in dustry .14
B ut th e  d isa s te r  in  F rance in J u n e  1940 
changed all that. As F rance toppled, the British 
p laced  o rd ers  for every conceivable k ind  of
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military hardw are, including tanks, in C anada.15 
Moreover, th e  loss of v irtually  all of B rita in ’s 
m odem  tanks in France m eant th a t British tank 
p roduction  w ould be stre tch ed  to th e  lim it to 
supp ly  its owm forces. In the sh o rt term  there 
w o u ld  be  no  p o ss ib ili ty  of e q u ip p in g  the  
C anadian arm oured divisions with British tanks. 
C anada  w ould have to build  its owm.16
Such  w as the extent of the  C anadian  arm y's 
despera tion  for tan k s  of any  k ind th a t  in  the 
a u tu m n  of 1940 Colonel (later M ajor-G eneral) 
F rank W orthington. C anada’s foremost advocate 
of arm oured warfare, arranged for the purchase 
(for S I 20 each) of 265 R enault ta n k s  of 1917 
v in tage  from  s to rag e  in  th e  U nited  S ta te s . 
Hopelessly obsolete, they nonetheless proved to 
be usefu l tra in in g  veh ic les.17 B ut the  newly 
au thorized  4 th  an d  5 th  C anad ian  A rm oured 
Divisions needed 1,200 m odern ta n k s  betw een 
them . The C anadian Pacific Railway in  Montreal 
received orders for light in fan try -support tanks 
called Valentines, b u t these w'ere earm arked  for 
B ritish  u s e .18 Moreover. B ritish  tan k  doctrine 
wras a t la s t  evolving, and  C anad ian  doctrine 
evolved w ith  it. The light ta n k s  on w hich the 
B ritish  a rm oured  forces were based  h ad  been 
next to useless in France: w hat the arm y required 
w as a m edium  or “c ru ise r’’ tan k  which could 
roam  independently  of in fan try  in  a rm oured  
sp e a rh e a d s  of the  k ind w hich the  G erm ans 
u se d .19
W ith the autom otive in d u stry  tied up  in 
o rders for m otorized tra n sp o rt and  the CPR's 
A ngus Shops in  M ontreal p roducing  Valentine 
tan k s , capacity  for m edium  ta n k s  h ad  to be 
created  from scra tch . The M ontreal Locomotive 
Works rapidly co n stru c ted  a huge new' tan k  
arsenal, eight acres long, in  order to build  an 
A m erican -designed  m ed ium  ta n k , th e  M-3 
G ran t, in  C a n a d a .20 From  a m an u fac tu rin g  
perspec tive , th e  ad v a n ta g e s  of b u ild in g  an  
Am erican design as  opposed to a  B ritish one 
were n um erous. C om ponent p a rts  were more 
readily available from sources in the United 
S ta te s  th a n  in  G reat B ritain. F u rtherm ore , the 
G rant, m echanically  reliable an d  arm ed wdth a 
form idable 75 m m  gun , w as the  b es t m edium  
tan k  th en  available to the w estern  Allies. B ut 
the  G ran t h a d  one se rio u s  defect: its  m ain  
a rm am en t w as m ounted  not in  the  tu rre t, b u t
Colonel Frank Worthington, father of the Canadian 
armoured corps, climbing out of one of the obsolete 
Renault tanks acquired from the Americans in 1940.
in a  fixed position on the left side of the chassis, 
m aking it difficult for the tan k  to m aneuver into 
firing position .21
These fau lts  prom pted  W orthington a n d  his 
tiny engineering staff, w orking in  consu lta tion  
with the British Tank M ission in W ashington, to 
p ro p o se  a m o d if ie d  G ra n t  fo r C a n a d ia n  
p roduction . The envisioned tank , to be called 
th e  R am  ( th e  a n im a l  wms d is p la y e d  on  
W orthington’s family crest). wrould re ta in  the 
G ran t's  ch ass is  b u t m oun t its m ain  gun  on a 
revolving tu rre t ra th e r  th a n  on the  hull, giving 
the tan k  a 360-degree range of fire. Furtherm ore, 
it w ould have a m uch  lower s ilhouette  th an  the 
G rant, th u s  exposing a sm aller target to the  
enem y.22 The com pleted Ram  w as a five-man, 
30-ton m edium  tank , arm ed with a  6 -pounder 
m ain  gun  an d  two .30-calibre m achine guns. It 
w as reliable, quick, a n d  m aneuverab le  for its 
size.23 The prototype w as tested  in  Ju ly  a t the 
A b e rd e e n  P ro v in g  G ro u n d s  in  M a ry la n d  
(significantly, six  m o n th s  before the  U nited 
S ta te s  e n te re d  th e  w ar) w here  t e s t  crew's 
considered it to be a  m uch  be tte r tan k  th an  the 
Grant. W orthington also believed tha t the design 
of the M-4 Sherm an, successor to the Grant, was 
based  in large p a rt on  the  Ram  pro to type.24
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Ram tanks in production at the Montreal Locomotive Works, July 1942
The loss of nearly  a  y ea r's  lead-tim e on 
m ilita ry  o rd e rs  h a d  se rio u s  co n seq u e n c e s . 
Industry  received its first o rders  for tan k s  in 
May 1940, b u t a  year p assed  before the first 
C a n a d ia n -b u il t  ta n k , a n  a lre a d y  o b so le te  
Valentine, appeared . The prototype of the  Ram 
followed in Ju ly  1941.25 Full-scale p roduction  
did no t to begin until early 1942. by which time 
the S h erm an  w as already rolling off assem bly  
lines in the United States. Between the inception 
of th e  idea  of C a n a d ia n  ta n k s  a n d  a c tu a l 
p ro d u c tio n  lay  a ju n g le  of a d m in is tra tiv e , 
economic, technical, and  military confusion. The 
c e n t r a l  p ro b le m  w a s  p e r h a p s  th e  m o s t 
e lem en ta ry  one: C a n a d ia n s  knew  v irtua lly  
no th ing  abou t designing, building, or testing  
tan k s , sim ply b ecause  there  were hard ly  any 
tan k s in  C anada to begin with. T hat tan k s were 
som eth ing  new u n d e r the su n  is evidenced by 
contem porary  accounts of their developm ent in 
C anada  in which the  a u th o rs  struggle to find 
lan g u a g e  to  d e sc rib e  veh ic les  w h ich  m o st 
C anad ians  h ad  never seen: "The ta n k ,” wrote 
M aclean's Frederick E dw ards, "is com parable 
to a  subm arine , onlv the tan k  is sm aller.” while 
28
a colum nist in Canadian Business  gushed about 
“aw e in s p i r in g ,  a r m o u r - p l a t e d ,  m o b ile  
fo rtresses” th a t  are "exceptionally difficult for 
the enemy to stop.”26 Delacour Beamish. Director 
of the Tank Production Branch, fared little better 
in  a n  a rtic le  for the  C anad ian  G eographic  
Journal: “the  ta n k .” he wrote, "is som ew hat like 
a  trac to r...an d  som ew hat like a  locom otive.”27
The fact of the  m atter, however, w as th a t 
ta n k s  were no t like trac to rs , subm arines , and  
locomotives. Nothing like a  ta n k  had  ever been 
m a n u fa c tu re d  in  C a n ad a . M any C a n a d ian  
engineers h ad  never seen  a tank, let alone been 
ta s k e d  w ith  d e s ig n in g  one . F u r th e rm o re , 
Am erican b ranch  p lan ts in C anada tended to be 
involved in m anufacturing  engineering and  final 
assem bly only: design engineering rem ained the 
dom ain  of th e ir  p a re n t firm s in  th e  U nited 
S ta te s .28 B u t A m erican  firm s, desp ite  th e ir 
ab u n d an ce  of engineering ta len t, h ad  scarcely 
m ore experience  in  ta n k  design  th a n  th e ir  
C anad ian  su b sid ia rie s ,29 a  fact w hich required  
the  British, in the sum m er of 1940, to establish  
a m ission in W ashington to assist in tank  design.
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M uch of the original design work on the Ram 
would emerge, not from C anada, b u t from  the 
United S tates and  from the British tank  mission 
in  W ashington. Indeed, a  p lan  to design diesel 
engines for tanks in Canada was shelved because 
"the forecasted period of time necessary to evolve 
design, m anu factu re  engines, tes t, an d  finalize 
design” in C anada was considered prohibitive.30 
Furtherm ore, although 12 C anadian firms were 
involved in  m aking com ponent p a rts  for the 
Ram, m any of the  tan k 's  m ajor sub-assem blies 
could no t be m anu factu red  in  C anada .31 The 
R am 's gun  m ountings, tran sm ission , engine, 
suspension , and  indeed the a rm o u r p late  itself 
had  to be im ported from the United S tates.32 The 
dependence on the United S tates, a  hallm ark  of 
the  C anad ian  autom otive industry , w as even 
greater in tank  production. Beam ish complained 
th a t  the  US O rdnance  D ep a rtm en t literally  
dom inated C anadian  tan k  production by virtue 
of its  s tra n g le h o ld  on e sse n tia l com ponen t 
p a rts .33
The problem s th a t confronted p roduction  
were so num erous and  so com plex th a t, were it 
n o t for th e  fac t th a t  so m an y  ta n k s  w ere 
successfully built, one might be tem pted to agree 
with the British governm ent's initial assessm ent 
that C anadian firms were not com petent to build 
tan k s . No firm in C anada  h a d  ever produced  
a rm oured  steel. S hortages of m ach ine  tools
delayed production. Specifications received from 
B rita in  lacked  th e  n e c e s sa ry  in s tru c tio n s . 
S h o r ta g e s  of 6 -p o u n d e r  g u n s  fo rced  th e  
installation of nearly useless 2-pounder guns on 
the  f irs t 50  R a m s.34 A rg u m en ts  a b o u t th e  
com position an d  ju risd ic tion  of the  D irectorate 
of T ank  Design, an  adm inistrative body charged 
w ith  c o o rd in a tin g  a rm y  e n g in e e r in g  a n d  
in d u stria l p roduction , persis ted  un til A ugust 
1942.35 B ut by the  tim e production  ceased  in 
the  sum m er of 1943, nearly  2 ,000  R am s had  
b een  b u ilt ,  a  re m a rk a b le  a c c o m p lish m e n t 
considering th a t, ju s t  two years earlier, no tank  
h ad  ever been m anufactu red  in Canada.
As early as  A ugust 1942, however. A.G.L. 
M cNaughton, com m ander of the F irst C anadian 
Army, h ad  decided th a t standard iza tion  of tan k  
forces an d  p roduction  on a N orth Am erican 
basis  should  be achieved as  quickly as possible, 
and  th a t  th e  M-4 S herm an , by th en  rolling off 
A m erican assem bly  lines in huge n u m b ers , 
would be the tan k  of choice.36 Nevertheless, the 
arm y h ad  com pelling reasons to con tinue  Ram 
production in  the sh o rt term . M cNaughton had  
publicly declared th a t the  C anad ian  Army in 
E ngland  w as a "dagger poin ted  a t the  h e a rt of 
Berlin’’37 b u t the  fact of th e  m atte r  w as very 
d iffe ren t. T he sam e  m o n th , B rigad ier R.A. 
Wyman, com m anding officer of the 1st Canadian 
Tank Brigade, com plained bitterly:
Male and female workers assemble instrument panels fo Ram tanks at the Montreal Locomotive Works Plant, 1942.
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RAF Mustang aircraft fly over Ram tanks of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
during an Air/Tank Cooperation exercise, Aldershot, England, 22 December 1942.
after fourteen m o n th s  in E ngland, th e  C dn. T ank  
Bde. is non-effective b ecau se  of faulty  equipm ent. 
It h a s  no  p la c e  in  a n  opera tional role... th e  m a n  
e lem en t is excellent, a n d  th e re  is a n  a b u n d a n c e  
of q u a lified  sp e c ia lis ts , b u t. o u t o f a  to ta l is su e  
of 271 C hurchill ta n k s , only 107 a re  serviceable.
One ba tta lion  had  been  reduced  to only ten 
serviceable tanks.38 Morale am ong the personnel 
assigned  to the  C hurchill tan k s  w as falling, as 
th ey  h a d  ‘'e n tir e ly  lo s t  c o n fid e n ce  in  th e  
m echan ical reliability of th e  C hurch ill.”39 The 
following m onth, the rem aining Churchills would 
te s t th e ir m ettle on the beaches a t  Dieppe, with 
resu lts  th a t  a re  well know n. So acu te  w as the 
sh o rta g e  of o p e ra tio n a l ta n k s  in  th e  F irs t 
C anadian Army th a t M cNaughton felt compelled 
to order d rastic  lim its on the  speed of operation 
of all ta n k s  in  tra in ing  and  on the road  so as  to 
reduce the  potential acciden ts and  m echanical 
b reakdow ns w hich would fu rth e r reduce  his 
forces.40
ra d ia l eng ine . The S h e rm a n  s ta r te d  m ore 
quickly, w as considered  easie r to  drive and  
m aneuver th an  the Ram. and had  superior cross­
coun try  perform ance. In term s of its fighting 
qu a litie s , W ym an deem ed th e  S h e rm a n  far 
superio r to the Ram  in offensive a rm am en t and  
crew protection. The Ram ’s w orst features were 
held  to be its crew  accom m odations: the sm all 
t u r r e t  m a d e  w o rk in g  in s id e  th e  t a n k  
exceptionally uncom fortable, and  the  tu rre t was 
so cram ped th a t  the  loading breech  actually  
p ressed  down on the g u n n e r’s righ t leg w hen 
the 6-pounder w as elevated.41 Furtherm ore, the 
R am ’s tu rre t ring  h a d  been designed with an  
u tte r  lack of foresight: it w as too sm all to easily 
accom modate a  gun heavier than  the 6-pounder. 
A series of o th er evaluations reached  the sam e 
co n c lu s io n s. The Ram , n o t yet f in ished  its  
p roduction  run . w as already obsolete, and  the  
C anad ian  A rm oured Corps finished receiving 
them  ju s t  in tim e to s ta r t  replacing them .
B etter tan k s  were forthcom ing in  the  form 
of R am s and  S herm ans. In May 1943 W ym an’s 
brigade conducted  a series of tria ls  to  evaluate 
the M4 S h erm an  an d  the  Ram, and  concluded 
th a t the Sherm an  equaled or exceeded the Ram 
in a lm ost every respect. The S h e rm a n ’s engine 
w as m echanically  superio r an d  h ad  far fewer 
daily m aintenance requirem ents th a n  the Ram ’s
The Sherm an was. w ithout doubt, a  superior 
ta n k  to the Ram , an d  it proved to be a m uch  
m ore adap tab le  tan k  th an  any  o ther th a t the 
Allies p roduced  in the Second World War. Later 
m odels w ere rearm ed  w ith  a  m ore powerful 
76 mm high-velocity gun, a n d  som e B ritish  
m o d e ls  w ere  a rm e d  w ith  a n  even  b ig g er 
17-pounder. It should not be construed, however,
30
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th a t it rep resen ted  the  cu ttin g  edge in tan k  
design. By 1944 it w as ou tclassed  by the new  
generation  of G erm an tanks, and  it h ad  barely 
been a m atch for the previous one. U ndergunned 
(except in the rare  17-pounder varian ts), th in  
skinned, and  with an  alarm ing tendency to b u m  
w hen hit, the Sherm an w as a m atch  for G erm an 
heavy ta n k s  only w hen  it w as availab le  in  
superio r n um bers  -  w hich it u sua lly  w as.42 It 
was less a  trium ph of engineering th an  a victory 
for the Am erican system  of m anufacturing, tha t 
mode of production which the  US Army's official 
history defines as  “standardization of design and 
production in  volum e.” In the  w ar of m achines, 
m ass production, not the  m achines them selves, 
w as the  Allies' m ost powerful weapon.
This is in s ta rk  c o n tra s t to the  G erm an 
arm ed  forces. As R. J . Overy h a s  observed, the 
hallm arks of G erm an industry  h ad  always been 
the high quality  and  technical complexity of its 
p roducts . G erm an w eapons were p roduced  to 
exceptional s tandards, b u t were very costly and  
labour-intensive.43 Furtherm ore, in the jungle of 
fiefdoms th a t  com prised the Reich's economy, 
the  technical dem ands of the  arm ed forces took 
precedence over the  Nazi leadersh ip ’s dem ands 
for h igher production . The m ilitary’s incessan t 
dem ands for changes to design and  specification 
m andated short, expensive production runs. The 
re su lt w as a d ras tic  shortfall in  a rm am en ts  
production . In 1940, G erm any p roduced  only 
tw o-th irds as  m any p lanes an d  h a lf  as  m any 
veh ic les a s  G rea t B rita in  d esp ite  a n  a rm s 
expenditure  twice as large.44
The im b a la n c e  in favour of d esign  and  
developm ent over ac tual production resu lted  in 
a  m ultitude  of re d u n d a n t w eapon system s in 
G erm any. While the  United S ta tes  p roduced  a 
m ere 18 d ifferen t m odels of a irc ra ft in  the 
Second World War. G erm any developed 86.45 “At 
one point in  the war," Overy writes, “there were 
no fewer th an  425 different aircraft m odels and  
varian ts in production" in Germ any.46 Under the 
s p u r  of a rm a m e n ts  m in is te r  A lbert Speer, 
G erm an industry  m ade ex traord inary  efforts to 
rationalize p roduction  and  boost o u tp u t in  the 
la s t two y e a rs  of the  war, b u t  th e  G erm an  
preference for m atch ing  Allied q u an tity  w ith a 
variety of w eapons of very high quality persisted  
th ro u g h o u t  th e  w ar. W hile 8 0  p e rc e n t  of 
A m erican ta n k s  bu ilt in  1943 and  1944 were 
S h e rm an s , G erm an  p ro d uction  w as divided 
alm ost evenly between about 16 models of heavy 
a n d  m e d iu m  ta n k s ,  a s s a u l t  g u n s ,  t a n k  
destroyers, and  self-propelled artillery, m aking 
m ass p roduction  alm ost impossible. The ra th e r 
c ru d e  o b se rv a tio n  m ade in  the  US Official 
H istory th a t  “perfection is the enem y of good” 
w h e n  a p p lie d  to  th e  w ar in  E u ro p e , w as 
e s se n tia lly  c o rre c t.47 The G e rm a n s , Overy 
a rgued , a tte m p te d  to w in th e  w ar w ith  the  
w eapons of the  1950s (heavy tanks, jets , guided 
rockets), while the Allies actually  did wan it by 
m ass  producing  the  w eapons of the  1930s.48
There is no  denying th a t  G erm any’s tan k s  
could be form idable. In one fam ous inciden t in 
th e  su m m e r of 1944, a  so lita ry  T iger ta n k  
craw led from the woods n e a r  C aen an d  left 25
B ritish tan k s  b u rn in g  in  its w ake. As a ru le  of 
th u m b , Am erican tan k  crew s considered  five 
S h e rm an s  equal to one G erm an  Panther, and  
e ight S h e rm a n s  equal to a  Tiger. B u t su ch  
w eapons were thankfu lly  so scarce  th a t  they 
could only delay, not alter, the eventual outcom e 
of the w ar.49 M ass production did no t necessarily 
yield inferior equ ipm en t. The U nited  S ta te s  
m anufactu red  several superb  m odels of aircraft 
and  the C anad ian  M ilitary P a tte rn  tru c k s  were 
well-known for their robustness an d  m echanical 
reliability. Nor w as the insistence on m echanical 
perfection alw ays lim ited to the  W ehrm acht.00 
B u t it w as a g en e ra l c h a ra c te r is t ic  of th e  
A m erican an d  C a n a d ian  a rm ies  to to le ra te  
in fe r io r  e q u ip m e n t  p ro v id e d  it c o u ld  be 
fu rn ished  to them  in vast quan tities.
B ritish p roduction  m ethods apparen tly  fell 
som ew here betw een the G erm an a n d  Am erican 
extrem e. B ritish industry , w hich did  n o t adopt 
the moving assem bly  line u n til th e  1930s, only 
gradually  adopted m ass p roduction  techniques 
in the  p roduction  of aircraft a n d  u n arm o u red  
vehicles.51 Moreover, B ritish  p roduction  was 
increasingly afflicted by in cessan t dem ands for 
m o d if ic a tio n s . In  1942  th e  e x a s p e r a te d  
Am erican m an u fac tu re r of the  G ran t actually  
refused fu rther design changes from the British 
arm y. By 1944, tan k  production in  Britain itself 
w as no higher th a n  it had  been  in 1941, while in 
G e rm a n y  a n d  th e  U n ite d  S t a te s  i t  h a d  
quadrup led .52
The question  th a t  a rises, th en , is w hether 
C an ad ian  p roduction  w as organized  on  th e  
Am erican model or one closer to th a t  u sed  by 
the E uropean powers. The British official history 
notes with paternalistic dism ay the  “u n d u e” size 
of th e  C a n a d ia n  a u to m o tiv e  in d u s try  a n d  
coun try ’s n a tu ra l preference for vehicles m ade 
to Am erican s ta n d a rd s , even in  sp ite  of long­
s ta n d in g  B r i t i s h  p o lic y  m a n d a t in g  th e  
s ta n d a rd iz a tio n  of w eapons th ro u g h o u t th e  
E m p ire .53 B u t w ere C a n a d ia n  p ro d u c tio n  
m ethods, in fact, based  on the American model? 
In regards to m otorized tra n sp o rt, the  answ er 
is yes. C a n a d ian  b ra n c h  p la n ts  of G eneral 
M otors, Ford, and  C hrysler n o t only produced 
m ilitary  vehicles in vast q u an titie s , b u t  also 
broke away from the policy of s tandard iz ing  
basic  design w ith  th a t of the B ritish  Army. By 
mid-war. s tandard iza tion  on a N orth A m erican 
b a s is  becam e the unofficial policy, a n d  the
B ritish  official h is to ry  of o v e rse a s  su p p ly  
grudgingly adm its th a t “it w as only possible for 
C anada to pull her weight a s  a  m anu factu rer of 
a rm am en ts  by producing Am erican types.”54
Here again the  con trast w ith Nazi G erm any 
is strik ing. As the Army Engineering Design 
B r a n c h ’s  D e s ig n  R e c o rd  n o te s ,  “w h ile  
o u ts tan d in g  po in ts  of criticism  (in regard to 
vehicle  design) w ere c o rre c te d ...it  m u s t be 
understood th a t industry  ben t every last facility 
tow ards production and  th u s  a pause to change 
tooling or layout for a new design was often next 
to im possible.”55 Organized around  a handful of 
basic  m odels, the  so-called C anad ian  M ilitary 
P a tte rn  vehicles a tta in ed  a very high degree of 
in terchangeab ility  of p a rts  an d  were produced  
in  en o rm o u s  q u a n ti tie s .56 By c o n tra s t, the 
G erm an arm ed forces a t one point h a d  141 
different m odels of tru ck  in production , and  on 
the eve of its invasion of the Soviet Union, the  
arm y w as sadd led  w ith 2 .000  different types of 
vehicles requiring m ore th an  a million different 
sp a re  p a r ts .57 T h a t su c h  a s itu a tio n  w as a 
quarterm aster's  nightm are, and  un tenab le  from 
the point of view of m echanical m ain tenance, is 
obvious enough -  and  is confirmed in the alm ost 
to tal collapse of the logistical backbone of the  
G erm an arm y in  the late fall of 1941 as the truck 
pool d im inished  to barely  one-ten th  its p re­
invasion size. By contrast, the British. American, 
and  C anadian arm ies achieved an  extraordinary 
degree of standard ization  on a few- basic models 
of m o to r iz e d  t r a n s p o r t ,  a n d  c o m p a ra b le  
inciden ts, like the  breakdow n of the  British 
Second Army G roup 's tru ck  pa rk  owing to a 
faulty p iston ring design, were thankfully rare.58
W ith tan k  developm ent, the question  abou t 
m ass  p roduction  is m ore difficult to answ er. 
There are  fewer exam ples to judge by: only the 
V alen tine  a n d  R am  w ere p ro d u ce d  in  any  
q u a n t i ty  in  C a n a d a . N o n e th e le s s ,  m o s t 
in d ic a tio n s  a re  th a t  so m e th in g  like  m a s s  
production w as achieved with tanks in C anada. 
D espite the enorm ity of the adm in istra tive and  
e n g in e e r in g  p ro b le m s  fa c in g  th e  R a m ’s 
designers, the  ac tu a l ra te  of p roduction  m et or 
exceeded expectations once the Ram entered the 
m a n u fa c tu r in g  s tag e . M oreover. C a n a d ia n  
p ro d u c tio n  w as n o t afflicted by a desire  to 
p roduce w h a t the  B ritish official h isto ry  calls 
tan k s  built to the "Rolls-Royce’’ s ta n d a rd .59 The 
em phasis  in  C anad ian  m anufactu ring  w as on
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Two Ram tanks on a firing range in England.
easier and  b e tte r  p roduction , as  opposed to 
m inor changes for tactical im provem ent.60
F urtherm ore , p roduction  a t the  M ontreal 
Locomotive Works w as standardized on the Ram 
and  th en  th e  Sexton self-propelled gun  (which
w as itse lf essen tia lly  a  heavy artillery  piece 
m ou n ted  on a R am  ch assis) in  sp ite  of the 
d e m a n d s  from  c e r ta in  in d iv id u a ls  in  th e  
D epartm ent of M unitions and  Supply th a t MLW 
produce a tank  as a  successor to the Ram. Senior 
figures in  M unitions an d  Supply  were anx ious
Ram Tank by George Douglas Pepper
th a t C anada not pu rchase  more tan k s  in  the US 
th an  absolu tely  necessary , a s  they desired  to 
m ain ta in  a  co n tin u a l flow of p ro d u c tio n  in 
C anada  in  light of the enorm ous expense they 
h ad  incu rred  by creating  ta n k  m anufactu ring  
capacity in the first place. McNaughton, however, 
believed th a t  the  advan tag es  of lim iting the 
n u m b e r  of types of veh ic les in  p ro d u c tio n  
ou tw eighed  all o th e r  c o n sid e ra tio n s , a n d  a 
p ro d u ctio n -ru n  of C anad ian -m ade S h erm an s 
(called Grizzlies) w as cancelled after fewer th an  
200 u n its  were com pleted .61
After a  brief period of techn ical innovation 
in w hich it m anaged to produce a tan k  th a t w as 
a fine balance of speed, arm our, and  arm am ent. 
C an ad a’s ta n k  program  rapidly fell b eh ind  on 
the  engineering front. B u t while it is tru e  th a t 
C anada’s D irectorate of Tank Design lacked the 
en g in ee rin g  ta le n t to  keep  pace  w ith  ta n k  
developm ent in the United S tates, it is also true 
th a t the exigencies of m ass production m ade an  
o v e r - e m p h a s is  o n  d e s ig n  e n g in e e r in g  
undesirab le  anyway. The rap id  obsolescence of 
the  R am  therefore  reflected  no t j u s t  a  lack 
indigenous engineering talen t, b u t a  preference 
for m ass  p roduction  over techn ical excellence. 
It is a n  im portan t fact th a t  after 1942 none of 
the w estern  Allies p roduced  a tan k  capable of 
com bating the b es t G erm an tan k s  on any th ing  
like equal term s. C anada’s shortcom ings on the 
engineering front m ay have been severe, b u t they 
m ay have been  equally irrelevant w hen the real 
goal w as s ta n d a rd iza tio n . M cN aughton h ad  
expressed  h is preference for a  s tandard iza tion  
of N orth  A m erican  a rm o u red  forces on the  
S h erm an  as early as  A ugust 1942, well before 
field tr ia ls  h ad  e s ta b lish e d  for c e rta in  the  
S h e r m a n 's  s u p e r io r i t y  o v e r  th e  R am . 
F u rtherm ore , even as  late  as  November 1943. 
he con tinued  to  express faith in the  Ram  as an  
operational tank  shou ld  the need arise, and  the 
possib ility  of rearm ing  the  ta n k  w ith  a  heavier 
gun  w as reserved as  a  contingency. “No one," he 
rem arked , “sh o u ld  poin t the  finger of sco rn  at 
C anadian  industry ."62 The biggest problem  with 
the Ram  w as not its inferiority, b u t th a t it w as a 
Ram  in the  first place.
The Sherm an  was. undeniably, a  better tank  
th an  the Ram. C anadian  engineers had  failed to 
k eep  p a c e . B u t to  M c N a u g h to n  a n d  h is  
c o u n te r p a r t s  in  th e  A m e ric an  a rm y , th e  
S h e rm a n ’s real v irtue w as th a t  it w as rapidly
becoming the tank  on which the Allied arm oured 
forces w ere s ta n d a rd iz in g . The vo lum es of 
m em oranda passed  between the First C anadian 
Army an d  C a n a d ian  M ilitary H ea d q u a rte rs  
r e tu rn  to th is  p o in t a g a in  a n d  aga in . The 
a rm oured  division w as despera te  to replace the 
“m ixed bag" of R am s. C hurch ills , an d  early 
model S h erm an s w ith a  single tan k  in o rder to 
reduce train ing, m ain tenance, and  spare  p a rts  
problem s,63 a  view they em phasized in a  lengthy 
m em orandum  to M cNaughton which concluded:
It is  co n sid ered  th a t  th e  s ta n d a rd iz a tio n  o f ta n k  
e q u ip m e n t o f th e  C an ad ian  a rm y  o verseas w ith  
th a t  of th e  W ar Office a n d  of th e  US A rm y w ould  
p re s e n t d is tin c t a d v a n ta g e s  to  th e  C a n a d ia n  
A rm y th ro u g h  c o m m o n a lity  of m a in te n a n c e  
facilities a n d  p a r ts , espec ia lly  in  c a se s  w here  
in d iv idua l u n i ts  o r  fo rm atio n s  a re  o p e ra tin g  in 
co n ju n c tio n  w ith  a  B ritish  o r  US force.w
This paralleled  the US Army’s own policy. 
They considered the  advantages of m ain tain ing  
S h e rm a n  p ro d u ctio n , d esp ite  all th e  ta n k 's  
defects, to outweigh the advantages of disrupting 
p roduction  in favour of a  newer, more powerful 
tan k  -  of which several were in the developm ent 
stages. W hether or not th is  w as the  correct 
decision is beside the  point: A m erican m ilitary 
p lanners m ade the decision because they agreed 
t h a t  th e  a d v a n ta g e s  of s ta n d a r d iz a t io n  
outw eighed the  d isad v an tag es  of p roducing  
inferior ta n k s .65 The US Army’s em phasis  on 
s ta n d a r d iz a t io n  of t r a in in g , ta c t ic s ,  a n d  
equ ipm en t w as so g rea t th a t  in  1945 C anada 's  
request to take  p a rt in the  proposed invasion of 
J a p a n  w a s  a c c e p te d  w ith  th e  e x p re s s  
understanding  that the C anadian forces involved 
w ould be reorganized along  A m erican lines, 
supplied entirely w ith American equipm ent, and 
tra ined  in the United S tates. A ustralia’s  offer of 
a ss is ta n c e  w as refused  by the Jo in t Chiefs of 
S taff b ecau se  the  A ustra lians would no t agree 
to the sam e term s.66 In short, it may well be the 
case  th a t  even if C anada h ad  possessed  the 
engineering ta len t to keep pace in  tan k  design 
w ith  the  U nited S ta tes , the Ram  w ould have 
n o n e th e le ss  been  fated  for the  s c ra p  heap  
b ecause  of the  desire for standard iza tion  -  a 
desire w hich preceded the  ta n k ’s obsolescence.
C.P. S tacey’s  adm onition  th a t  th e  Ram  w as 
C an ad a ’s Second World War equivalent to the 
Ross Rifle a n d  w as b e tte r  not p roduced  a t all is 
too severe.67 The Ram  was designed and  p u t into
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production a t a  time when the United States was 
n eu tra l and  before the Lend-Lease agreem ent 
w as m ade. No one could confidently predict 
w hen (or if) the United States, with its enorm ous 
m ilitary poten tia l, would jo in  the Allied cause. 
F u r th e rm o re , th e  R am  d id  se rve  a  u se fu l 
purpose: it equipped  the  C anad ian  arm oured  
divisions in  the interval betw een the  collapse of 
B rita in’s own arm oured  forces in the  Battle of 
F ra n ce  a n d  th e  av a ilab ility  of ta n k s  from  
Am erican p roduction  in  sufficient q uan tities  to 
equip all the Allied arm ies. Modified Ram s saw  
service in  a  variety of form s, m ost notably as 
com m and vehicles and  as the fam ous Kangaroo 
a rm oured  personnel carriers .68
To the  h isto rian , however, the R am  stan d s  
for som eth ing  greater. It sym bolizes both  the 
rem arkab le  ach ievem ents an d  lim ita tions of 
C anad ian  in d u stry  in  th e  Second World War. It 
a lso sh ed s som e light on w hat is p e rh ap s the 
fundam ental reason why the Allies won the war: 
th e  p re fe re n c e  for m a s s  p r o d u c t io n  a n d  
s ta n d a rd iz a tio n  over h igh  q u a lity , b u t  low 
volume m anufactu ring . In the Allied arm ies, 
quan tity  had  a un ique quality  of its own.69
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